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Mr. Eeach In the preface to his: work on receivers,
the latent treatise on that subject, and one v,'hlc- 18
sure ofmectin ,-:.':Ith unlver; I approval, Bt ,tea thbt
the law of receivers Is the growth of the last tventy
years. Had this ftatement been confiner to the law of
Railway Receivers, and more especially to the 1w of
Rlecelvers Certificates, its correctnens would be url-
denied. hut the fourtF, of equity, in certain cmoec.
claimed and exercited thls right of appoIntinq receivers
long before transportbtion by rail was introduced.
Hovever the law of receivers in ,eneral iq very ably
treated in the thesis of a fellow claae-mate,and there-
fore we tll it once take up the special branch cf which
we are to vrite, viz: VThen a !eceiver is appolntel in
a Mortgage Foreclosure.
A receiver has been defined as "an indifferent
persol: between the parties to a cause, appointed by the
court, to receive or preserve the property. or f~nd in
litivatlon, and receive the rents, Issue,- and protflts,
and apply or dispose of them at the direction of the
court, when it does not Ceom reasonable that either
party should hold theme" (1) He is not the agent of
either party to the action but an offlcer of the
court, and being such an officer, the fund or property
which is entrunted to him is said to be in the custody
of the court, for the benefit of the one who proves his
title to the name. Mr. High (2) speaks of a receiver
as "the hand of the courtj " and very neatly compares
him, as the executive officer of a court of equity, to
the sheriff, as the executive officer of a court of law.
Yet the authority of a re.elver in more comprehensive
than that of a sberiff, as the former is obliged to pay
all the demands on the fund in his hanl from that
fund as long Im it lasts, while a sheriff has only to
satiefy his; execution from the property on which he makes
the levy. A~n appointment of a receiver has been held
to be, in effect, an' lequltbble execution ".
(1) Cortleyeu v Hathaway, &I ram. Dec. 416. note.
(2) High on Recelvere. Sec. 1 & 2.
Although It I8 well ectablIshed that equity hian
the power to appoint a receiver over mortgaige preminec
for the protection of the mort!:;agor or mortgagee, or
in aid of an action for foreclosure, an,1 although the
courte of equity, both of England and imrerlca, have
long exercioed this right, yet it Is exerclneri with
grett ,aution. If there is a full, adequate, and com-
plete remedy at lavv, a receiver vill never (re a, pointed.
Extraordinary and imperative reasons must be shown in
or-er to obtain the benefit of this extraordinary re-
lief. The exercloe cif thLi power must depend upon the
sound decretion of the court, and chould only be grant-
ed when it appears fit and reaconable that nome Indif-
ferent person, under approved security, should receive
and distribute the i'rsues and profits for the greater
safety of all partle'n concerned. (1) The general rule
Is thtit if the mortgage preralneo are an insufficient
security for the debt, or thait there Is imminent danger
of vwaste,dectruction or removal of the property, and
(1) Verplank v Calnes, 1 John's. Chan. 5 ,.
that the mortgagor or the one personally liable, is in-
solvent, a receiver may be appointed in an action foz
foreclonure. here munt in all cases be a ntrong
special ground for the relief' shown, and unless such
ground le shown, a receiver will never be aijpolnted of
couro e.
There Is also a strong destinction between cases
in which the mortgagee has the legal title, and where
the title to the Droperty Is still in the mortgagor,
the mortgnce having only a lien upon the property an
security for his .]ebt. An! this distinction as to the
title Is also, in fact, the distinction between the
English or Common Law, and the American or Lien 'Theory
of mortgages.
At common law, the mortgagee was 'eemerl to be
ven, ted ith a legal title and had a right to take im-
mediate ponsesion of the mortgaged premlses. The
mortgagor in posession was deemed simply t.a tenant at
will or rather at sufferance, and hence the mortgagee
could sustoin ejectment arvainat him to recover posses-
sion without notice t, quit.
In oquity the relation between mortgtgor Eind mort-
gagee were deemed very different. There the mortgagor
vs deemed the owner, the morti<aie being deemed a mere
"personal security4 " and the mortgagee was considered
as having merely a lien or security for the payment of
the mortgage debt whlch he could enforce by foreclosure.
These equitable coneirlerations were, of course, not vwith
out their effects upon the legal rights and remedies
of the parties, so that in courts of law the mortgagor
in possession could not be deemed a trespasser, nor
cofampelled to aceount for the rents and profits whicb he
had actual) received while in possession. Yet the
mortgagee, tnder hic,, right to enter, could thus inter-
cept at any time the receipt of the accruing rents,
and vwhen the premi.,es were i,! the possesslon of a ten-
ant who had entered u'ider the mortg-agor prior to the
mortgage, the mortgagee by giving him notice could corn-
pel him to pay the rent to him. At one time, the
right was cu-ppooc(d to exit whether the lease wan prior
or subsequent to the mortgage; but the later caeo
make a distinction, holding thaft without ") voluntary
attornment to the mortgnge by the tenant under a lease
subsequent to the mort!a ethere is no relbtlon of land-
lord and tenant exiting betwvzen them. In the case of
a prlor leape the mortgagee by giving the tenant notice
of his mortgage could require the latter to pay him,
s viell unpaid rent wlich had accrued subsequent to the
mortgage, as that wtch here after accrued.
.In the state of' New York the principl-s of the
rule in Ehglish courts of law and equity have been en-
sentially changed. Even before the revlset statutes
ejectment could not be sustained in our courts by the
mortgagee without notice to quit; and under those
statutes the right to maintair, ejectment was wholly
taken UVaw. The mort,('ge i x ;- , both ft law and in
equity in this state deemed simply a lien for the se-
curlty of the mort ' c debt, the rmortga'or being deem-
ed vested with a le -il eqttate both tit law and in equity.
Under thin radical chanrtge in the relvtonn which
formerly exlted between the partiec, the le-l remedlea
of the partlec ac againet each othei must necessarily
be materially modified from what they were tuder the
Engl!sh rule. The !1ower contained in the mortga;[tge
cimply authorizes the mortgaqee, upon the default of
payment, to oell the premiFen] at public auction, and to
apply the proceeds of such setle to the payment of the
morttgage de'ftt.
Unlenn- there be a npecIfic clauF-e to that effect,
the mort-aqee hao no lien upon the rento and profite,
and ac aj general rule the mort!agor, until the sale, i
entitled to remain in poeseoclon. The mortqagee hao
no lien upon timiber cut upon the premies In g ood fati,
thoug;'h the mcrtgagor war. at the time inoolvernt, and the
premises were an innufflcient necurit'y for the mo)-t ,Ie
debt. Nor ha6 he,at law, any remedy for the rents,
for, until the lm lo, he ha; no 10JKU 1 title to poooemsion,
The power of rmle only conterplaten an a- 1propriation of'
the proceeds of' the nale of the yrricien to the pDa)rent
of the debt. Put the courtn 01' equit.;r,adhering to the
ancient practice, unler certain circn~<t' Mr'Cc, '.-1 : fto
.o..- default, in an action for foreclci3ure and nale,
anticipate the final judgTment of' the court, by the ap-
polntment of a receiver, and, in effect, put the mort-
gagee in poesen)Ion and allow him to divert the rente
and profits of the mortgag!o'ed preml, en fron the hando of
the mortgatgor, and hold them ao additional necurlt:y for
the payraent of the mort tge debt.
To entitle him to this n pecieo of "equitable
ejectnentj" it muct appear thtt the nortgag"e preml-eo
are an inadequate security for the debt, and that the
mortgagier or other pernon liable for the mort;Ige lebt
i insolvent. Thle relief, it will be readily seen
from the conditions necesiary to its enjoyment, does
not grow directly out of the relations of the partien,
or the stipulationps cofituined in the mort uj"e; but out
of equitable conldiratilonn alone. It is not there-
fore a matter of Ptrict rig<ht, but is addrense,! to the
sound discretion of the court. 'vhen the mort ,,tgor
is lnoolvorit, and ftiilis to pay at the cly appointed,
and the mortguied premises are an inadequ-te security,
as between the mortgw'or and the mortg'tgee, it -ml ht
well be rieemed witlin the equitable discretion of the
court to allow te latter to Intercept the rcnte and
profits for Iii better rotectlon from loss. And this
simple case seems to be the mtro t extent to which thli
reilef hac been granted in the cases in which this ques-
tion han come up, or to which it can be granted within
any admitted principl5s of equity. Vlhen other partleg
have acquire:l rig)its before default, and especially
before the happening of those contingencles whici give
the mortgagaee any right to such relief, that is, when
the right or interest of thxe third party accrued before
the insolverncy of' the T ortgagor, conflicting equlties
may aris-e between which the courts would not ,loclle,
but leave the mort,;u1,eo to his direct remcdy bj judg-
ment; arnd lnder such circurntance there seenes tc *De
no case in the court:n of thin state in which the mort-
;mee has been given thin equitable possession of the
pretiseo before finul judg-ment, or by such final judy, f-
ment han been given posseoion, "flumc pro tunc" so ans
to be enabled to collect rents which had previoioly
uccrued. (1)
New Jersey, on tho contrnry, takes a ctond
directl.y7 opposed to that of New York. In commenting
on the rulings of the courts of this state, the hew
Jersey court in the leading case of Cortleyeu v
Hathaway, (2) nsays: "The rule so broadly laid down in
New York is not sustained by precedents, and is not free
from objections. No distinction is drawn between a
first and a subsequent mortg[agee. Their rights are
entirely diffe-ent. The first mortgagee has the legal
right to the rents and profits, but a court of equity
(1) Syracuse City Bank v Tallmn et al. 31 Barb. 201.
(2), 11 N.J.iSq. 39.
has beon roluctant to appoint n receiver on his ap-olt-
cation, for the re,:ion that he han a remedyv at law by
ejectment, by whlch he may get into the receipts of' the
rents and profto, "
The court then adopt what they conceive to be the
Enagllsh rule a! laid Iown by Lord Eldon in Berney V
Sewell. (1) "The rule about receivers Is clear: a
rortga'ee who ha. the leaal title cannot have c3 receiver:
he has nothlin to -do but take possesalon." It would
almost seem that the iew Jersey court wan wrong, both In
its crltlclsm of' the h,1ew fork rile and its conception
of the Fh linh rule. It fails to realize that in
thin ata.te there is no 1otilnction between a first and
second inort~!eee, both being Tnied a right of entry,-
the one by st:tute, and the other by commion law. It
aloe fails to uderstand the ngllsh rule. The l-in-
guaue of Lord hldon clearly expresses bo-h the rule and
the reason, but in the cane before the court there
were no alle-ations of insufficiffIcY and insolvency.
(1) 1 Jac. & V i. 64z.
-A receiver i.o nppointe1 independent of there connider-
atlons, on the 'rouad that Whe(re there is a rl!,ht, there
shoull be u remedy, if not -it law, then in eqult:/. A
thorouih examination of the Lkig llsh canes will reveal
the fact that insolvency and Insufficlency will, of
themselves, constitute a ,routd for the appointment of
a receiver, whether or not the mort-:agee Is entitled
to enter. They constitute. "special circumotances"
which have tilway: been deemed sufficlent ground for thi.m
relief. , A special circumstance I- any fact by reason
of wahlch the mortgagee's security Is imperiled oc great-
ly Impairedil" (1) Where the mort,_agee may take pop-
session, and in compelled to sue in ejectment, It would
,,eem that the court should appoint a receiver, because,
pending the ejectment the rents and profits of the
estate are being rliverted from him, and he needs -ill the
rents and profits, when his securlt,' Is insufficient and
the mortgaugor lo insolvent, for the satisfaction of his
debt. (2)
(1) Vhite v Small, 22 Beav. T.
(2) Shepteins v Olive, 2 1-3rown-'s Chan. 75.
In Levtd the ruln to 8ubtantlaliy the -.nmo a3
that of New Yorl,, although the reanonlng from v: ich the
rule Is In. cel 1o very tlfferent. In lymelri v Kelly(1 )
the court say:; "The leislelature having forbilde-n the
mort.,eoe to pur.ue the common lav; remedy of ejectraent,
would, it seemo, be rather a reason for a more liberal K?
exercise of the chancellor's power8, to protect the ge-
curity vwhlcl he has for his debt." And in a sub-
sequent pairt of' the opinion, they apparently rely on
the Enaglish decisions to support this retisonlng. The
Engltph chancellors appolnted a receiver because the
mortg, agee was entitled to the rent8 and profits but
could not get possession at law. The conclusion of
the Nevada court is, perhaps, correct, but the rensoning
seems some what absurd.
Callfornia has a statute in all respects like the
Nevada statute; and yet the court refused to appoint
a receiver for insolvency and insufficaimcy, and Alleg-
ed as a reason for such refusal, the very s,, e which
(1) Hymen v Kelly, 1 .1\ev. 187.
in i.evau Is hel,1 to be ;'ood ground for hls apronit.
The courts say: (1) "Our otutute forbidn the mortgagee
frori recovering the morty:ed estate, and confines ri8
renedy to a foreclo-rer. Tihe name reason, therefore,
does not exint as by the En71ilish rule for the appoint-
ment of a receiver to collect the rcaitn and profits
pending the liti:'ution411 This court ovrrulecn the hew
York dec11sonn, and makes the namemis takeas the iKevada
court In rewi'-rd to the IB lish rule.
MIchian in the case of 'Jacgner V stone (2) fol-
lows the California decleion, while T.robably the best
cane In this country aupportinri the i, New york -1-cistons,
is Schrieber v Corey. (3) It falls into ro errors
and gives sound reasoning for its ruling. The court
says: "Although the mort~tgor has no le-iAl estate in the
lands mortg.aged, jet this court has recognized that he
has an eqnlitm le interest whirh the courts are bound to
protect; and1 that the mortg,,cor must in some respects
be conotdered in poseenolon for the benefit of the
(1) (iray v Ire, 6 Cal. 101.
(2) 36 32Ich. 64.
(3) 48 a15. 208.
mort :fiee, He holds the estate mortt,,a,, ed, in some
respects us trustoe for the benefit of the mort 7U' ee,
and a court of Inquiry will Interfereto prevent the des-
tructloii or waste of the mortgako!{ed esthete by the mort-
gaor and those cltiltrlng) uidder him, when Jueb destructaio
or wste erldan:pers the nocurlty of thie rortbage.
AJl of these deo.!.iono rests in sne oneree a
the provlslon.q of the r:tatutes of the several 5t te.
In N~ew Jeroey alone. of the states mentioned, doen the
common law mortarge with its peculiur lncldenti- exist.
It will, therefore, be neceeary to enquire whether or
not its rule for the appointment of receivers is follow-
ed in states havlno, a similar morting,-e.
In Mississippi, where , after foreclosure, the
mort,-)ugee iD'. enter, it is expressly repudiated. The
court, after an able argument "y counsel, proceed to coa
ol'ior the rules which have guided courts in pa,,ssing on
an application fo- such relief. They conclude that
wherever the rents are necessary for the pa:ment of the
debt, the,\1 r will necure ther by the aTcpointment of a re-
ceiver whether or not the mort;. oe rrm v enter. They
',-: (1) " e urdin,< the mort,(we is more enpecially a
security foc the payment of a debt, we think the better
rule to be that whle,: will grant the receiver or nct,
s it may o,r Tnvy not be an ennentbtl means to pay the
debt. There can be no necenol ty for this auxiliary
remedy if the mort ,or le volvt and is, able to pay
the deficiency. In such cases, the creditor ought
to be left to his legal re',edy to get at the rents.
The Supreme Court of Tenensee hold the name Ioc-
trine; (2) ulso the courts of !entucky, (0) and south
Carolina. C') Vie have not been able to find cace
outside of -,,.ew Jersey which ho.,18 the contrary.
Thus we -ee that there is much confulion over thiln
subject in the courts of the diffenent qtaten; taind this,
we think, Is due to the failure of the courts to ap-
prehend the poosible consistency of the English and -,Nm
York rules. Vdenever the chancellors have departed
(1) Myers v Etsell, 4B Mics. 4M.
(2) V1llliams v Noland, 2 Tern. Chon. 151.
(3) IDouglan v Cline, 12 13ush. (06 - 22.
(4) Boyce v Boyce, 6 Ri . Eq. 30z.
from the iiew iork rule. they rely on the hmn'llsh cases.
vlhen they adopt tse h~ew York rule they condemn the Lhfg-
lish cases. They seem to have fulled to realize that
those two rules ai"dIy to an entirely lifferent state of
facts. Moot of the ifzignllsh cases allow a receiver
to aid the mortga-ee to collect the rents of property
to which he is entitled by virtue of the mortgag,*e, where
a lerul remedy is inadeue:)te or does not exlst.
In levm fork, on the contr,'ry, the receiver 1
allowed because the rents are needed for the satisfac-
tion of the debt, when the propert; is insufficient aid
the mort.awor is insolvent. The mortgagee has no
legal rlght.' to the rents, and of course no le-l rem-
edy; but it is not on this account that he Is entitled
to relief, as the 1Nevadu courts seem to imply. The
California court Is right in itr position, that t',e fact
that the lei;islature has taken frCn nortageeg the right
of entry is !/ood groutid for refusLng to appoint a receiver
under the En!)lsh rule. Yviere it erred, was in
13
falllng to give 3ue proninence to lnsuffn clenoy and In-
oolvency,whlch of thero &lveo may conf,;ttute sufficient
, rondE1 for the relief; .nd for the retjFon, thit ih ere
the mort taged property !- inadequate to pay the debt,
and the deficiency cannot be made up out of the mort-
gu.7or, equity vI ll, after forfeiture, Ltke poeooeooi1i
of the rents and aiDply theni to the debt. To compel
a man to bring ejectment under these circumtances
would be to compel him to incur adcll tional expense v;here
he is alreadr insufficiently secured, and In the mean
time to lose the rents9 whion 1roperly belong to him.
The Ie-al remedy i Inadequate and equity will interfere.
Some of the courts have even gone farther. In
Misiasipp! (1) it has been held, that where the prop-
erty Io insufficient to pa/ th, debt, a receiver should
be appointed, whether or nlot the mortgti;or is lngolvent.
To appoint a receiver under such circumstances. cannot
work an injury to the mortmgor, provided he be solvent.
He has nothing to do but to redeem. It is dif'flcult
(1) Uill v hobert :on, 24 Miss. 368.
to prove a man's 8olvericy, and such a rule precure it
aftc;r Jefault, thus relieving the mortgipee of' the bit-
den. Moct of' the rtt.ten, however, follow the 1!ew York
rule, that after rlefault and petiling foreclosure a re-
ceiver will be ,-_ppointed t,. take posses8ion of the
mortgaged property, whenever the property is lncuffla-
lent to pay the debt, and the person liabl is insolvent,
Vi7e have now seen when a receiver I a suit for
foreclosure will be appointed in the several states.
theoe rules seem to be well nettled; yet in reard to
the !New York rule, and hence in regard to the rule of
most of the statees, an objection arises which .seems to
have some foundation.
Suppose a motion is made f'or the appointment of'
a receiver in a foreclosure suit. The motion in not
based on groundu cet f'orth in the code, but simply on
the alleged inadequacy of the security, and insolvency
of the one personally liable. Can a receiver be
appointed? It would seem,after a careful study of the
cases, that unless the rents and profl to !ave been
opeclfically pledged, the court has no jurisdiction for
such an appolntnent. or, it might be more modest,
instead of Ptitlng the propooltion, to ask the questlon,
Wiqhether the court now htin jurisdiction to appoInt ', re-
ceiver on the ;rouril of intalequacy of the cecurity
and insolvency of the debtor, in the foreclos-ure of t,
mortugve, where the rents and profits have not been
specifically pled-ed?
Such a qu' stion never could have arism under the
late code but now arlee by reron of the changes rmade
by the pretcent code. 1P hab been shorn, It was the
undoubted practice of the old court of Chancery to ap-
point such recoivers; but the code of lc4A8 (1) did not
cont',in, in the enumerztion of crounds for the rrovis-
lonal remedy of receiver, the one under dlscu,-;olon.
hI-ut i fter a specific enumer tl on, there folowed a gen-
eral clausc authorizing tin appoinlutment In such other
cases as mi'ht be acnordIng to previuo practice.
(1) Sec. 244, Sub. 6.
So for thirty ;,crF, the cotrt ccrntlnued the prtuctlce of
tniontng, on eich 'rounln by virtue of' this I)rovii,,lon.
The repealing act (1) repeals section 24,1 subdivision S
of the code of 164 3, and the new code ccnth1ns no pro-
viion of irmil ir limort. (2) For such power, there-
foru, resort riuut novv be had to the generul juridlc-
tion of the court o, the succesor to the court of' Chan-
cery. Yet many grave question, unlooked for, and
difficult of' solution, have arlen by rea,,on of statu-
tory enactment; and so the revifred statutes are res-]pon-
8ible for the question now ralee: . (3) ,"No action
of ejectnent ,ihvll hereafter be mtintalne, by mortgagee
or hi8 ans gns or representatlves for the recovery of
the pouCesclon of the mortno't:ged premslper;," This
would sen to be a short concise otatement vilth no other
meanlng than that of allowlng the nortgagor to retain
po~seOS8ion.
-T, mortgo, or in posseoosion In accordance to Eng-
lish lav Ic regarded as a strict tenant Nt will of' the
(1) Laws of i' I, Cbnapter 4l1.
(2) Sec. 719.
(3) 2 -51~2, Sec. 51I.
that to vhicli he wafi leeoilly entitled, to ;et vilch he,
rnli7ht, if -he chone,haVe one to law In ejectment. In
givinR him v receiver, ChancerY cimply jut him in the
uay of obtaining thr'ugfh Ite ma(:hinery what w e his ov.'n.
There i no retil difference betv.een the ree ult.: of the
two actions. Both were different mean8 to the came
end. u ,t "he who seekr! eiuity must do equityj " or,
in once cen.e of thie phracse, he who invoker, the alid of
a court of equity cannot alwvay,, be allowed to inoi,,ct
on hic full rights at law. 7-hen o mortw ee had
chosen to ullovv a mortg.-agor to remain In possession and
received the rents and b-rofitcU to h1is ovf use, there
could be no equitable reason, upon a bill of foreclosure,
wi-y - mortga[or should be deprived of hi posession
before the decree, if the land were an adequate fsecur-
ity or he solvent. In such t casie, he would be like-
ly before decree to avail himself of" his equity of re-
demrption. 'he equitable. rule, therefore, grew up,
that when the mortgaee pirply came into equity to cut
mortguo'ee,who belng the leil oVMer, is. entitled at law
to the immoelate po cnoion, and to the receipt of rent
if the land In, in lease, and te rmay enter upon the mort-
gagor at any time, even before default in payment of the
mortg ',,ie money, and eject him. The mortgaj or consequent-
ly has no power of' making leases that wvill bind the
mortgt -oee, and when he collects rent he is only to bc
considered as receiving it inforder to pay the interer:t
vihich accrue on the morigatle, by an Impliec authority
from the mo. tgagee, untll the latter determine hie, wll
ae to 'hie, possesslon." (1) We may accept this an
a correct expositlon of the Lrir law of' thl stote. (2)
It is apparent that the jurisdiction in equity to
appoint a receiver in a foreclosure suit upon the groundS
under diLcussion, was base, upon this legal relation of
mortgagor and mortg;ogee. The mortgaee owned the
rents an well as the land. ,ihen, in a suit by a
mortgag!;ee out of poseession, to foreclose the equity of
redemption, he ap ;]led for a recelver, he asked only for
(1) Taylor's Land. & Tenant, 7th Ed. Sec. 120.
(2) Johnson v Hart, a John-'s. Case,, 322. 1R02.
off the mort;ti!;or'5 rigdht lf' redemption, a receiver
would not be appointed u1looc9 the recuri ty wau ina.1equcm te
and the owner of the equity inoolvent.
.In, 1()'60 came the abolli:,hment of ejectrent as
aglalnst a mort,, ji;or in )o0sseo1,. he ful1 bearlr
of that e ivm 'ee rot at onne perceived. The Ioc-
trine that the mort;<,e is but "a shadow of the rtebtb"l
"a ecurlty of a personal nature" or "a mere chos-e in
action" , 7ap of slow but lo;ical grov;th. JIo such ex-
preoOlons are to be found in the opinions of Chancellor
VWalviorth or the vice-chancellors. The ide. that had
exl,;ted for so long,, that te lel title was in the
mortg;agee, could not be done away vith at once, merely
by virtue of an act abolishint,: a partienlr kinl of
actlon againct b classp of per;, ris. Now the above ex-
prescions are co-.ion. "The mort-:ae;or'fn lDyu and equity
Is re arded as the owner of the fee, anid the mortgatie
is a mere c, lzos1ae In action, a re, urlty of a personal
natures" ('1) Evei, since 1iZ 0 fr,:m one cuse to another
(1) Trustees v eh1eeler, l .Y 115.
Trunr v -larsh, 54 N.Y. C04.
the courto have been eriimed in finding out and deter-
mining the result of thi, chan ;"e,but it hao been nlow
work. Time was needed to adju.st the 'nearing; of thin
change. '"It i( outles om chit incongruo ou, in
vim of the doctrine now wvell fnettled in thin ,tate
that u mortiga-ge is a mere eecurlty and not a title, to
define it an a conveyance of an ent ,,te or lnterest in
the land mortgaged, but the charaicter of mortcA-gen as
mere choisen, in action wan not a, well understood
when the hevl sed Statutes were enacted, ac it hae been
sincei" (1) AnJ though no such thing exlt8 in this
stute at the present ,Ity, the term of Equity of Redemp-
tion is often user both by courts and counsel.
However, as time went on, canes came up and
various questions were olvel. Among these cases
was one in 1B45. Lofioky v Manzer, holding that the fil-
ing a bill in foreclosure, of itself, create no lien on
the rents. Latei" in 1652, it was held that a moit-
ggafor Is entitled to the rentn to his own use dovn to
(1) Decler v Boyce, 83 IN.Y 220.
(2:') 3 Sand's. (Chan. 69.
the time vjhen the purchw;er 'it the 1,nle T er fore-
closuLre 1,9 entitled to the pCcerlr;ion of' the land. (1)
No ques9tion of i rcceIver viti. there involvel. T e
Chtncellor continue>i to appoint receiverfr on the ,me
ground Ifter the flevi ei tatuter i before, the first
reported ca.;e being Lank of Ogdensbnrg v Arnold. (.2)
No doubt aso to the right seems to haize been rtIFse] until
,1(.4, (C) when the vice-Chincellor dlpose, cf It by
saying, that having" been 'one by the Chancellor, he is
not ut. liberty to depart fro i it. hut he adds: "At
the same time, I confesie myself uriable to discover the
analo;Y or the principle under our laws in reltition to
the n, ture or true churactcr of s rnort- w ,,e, which auth-
orizes such --n interference with the leh.7al rihts of the
mortuor, unless lndee'i he hae by the e'press terms of
the contract plede'l the re-lt n1d profits. - as well
as the corpus, of the esthete-- as necurlty for the debt."
From that tire the question v,,tas not bgaln brought
uTs until 1858, when similar views were advanced by
1' Clason ' Cooley, 5 Sand. 447. aff'd in
._len v I - hilo. 2,5 R-.Y. 4 C.
(2) 5 Palos e, 38.(8) Post v Dorr, 4 £rdv . 412.
Chief JUl'e Andrews, then counsel in the case of Syra-
cuse City Lank v Talman. (1) But the court did not
pas upon this point. And from that time 'lown to thc.
prer ent, we have been jble to find no ctfe in vhich
thi,- point wtir' the one at Ifqqne. So the questi on, t
pre-0ent, is really an open on, and to be lookled at upon
principle.
1\oi.,, under wh,t principle, upon what theory, by
what right, can the conrt take from their owner the
rents and profits of his land, to which he has the legal
and equitable right, of which he hao not made pledgee.
and vests them in a receiver? \ihy is inadequacy of
securlty and Insolvenc.y of the Iebtor any more reason
for appointing a receiver in a foreclosure, than in any
other action? Principle says, and it might be said
that tie law If well settled, that courts whether at law
or in equity, are to construe, but not make contracts.
Prior to 1K30, a mortgagee's contract gave him title to
the lan-I ani hence a right to the rent and profits which
(1) 31 Barb. 201 at p. 204.
followerd the title.
S~nce 1U 0, h!: contrmct Kive., him no title to the
ltnd, no ri ,hts to the rents and pioflts, but slmi.uly
"security of a personrcl nitu-re. " If then a court ap-
points ) receiver, It makes a contract whlch the partle
had no intention of making, and it glves the mortf;,ygee
a oec-!,rlty never contracted for. "Equity follows the
law;" beln; no longer entitled to the rents and pIofito
at lav, how Is lie in equity? To say that the rents
grow out of' the land, and hence the mo-_tgagee i, entitl-
ed to them, begs the question. Pent is not an appur-
tenance to the land bnt. a profit issuing out of it.
It Is, "an Incident to the reverrlon." (1) The leval
title to the rent must follow the l <al title to the
land. The land has been pled ;ed to the mort,a, ec as
a security; he can only vork out a claim to the rents
by means of the claim to the land; and all the right
he has in law or equity in an ordinary foreclosure suit
is to have the land sold to pay his deb t. Then begins
(1) Taylor's Land. & Tenant, Sec. 154.
his right to the rents, If he has been the purchacer.
Ilp application for ; receiver, uTn the grounds under
consideration, i, no long er -nhlin: for dclocretion to be
exercie<:i In fnvor of Mie legal rlrhtn, but in wholl, an
applIcation to g 'ive him further sesiurlty Vi iob h, (lid
not ,ee fit to e:,:act when he made his contriact. No
suit can be maintained Iy a creditor to compel his
debtor to give him further security. He must either
realize on the seaurit he has or cot jud ent for his
debt. In refusing to adopt our rule in New Jer.sey,
even though ejectment there lay against the mortgafgor,
Chancellor Vk1lliamson said in Cortolyeu v Hathuwa y, (I
't, mo;tagee takes hi ecurity with full 1-owledge of
its value, and if he takes an inodequate necurity It if his
o1n fault," Now applying thin rule in a state
where the title to the land fnd therefore to the rents,
in law and in equity, is in the morti jor, we submit
It affords a reoon for denying to a mortgagee a receiv-
er on the grounds merely of inadequacy and insolvency.
-----------------------------------------------------
(1) 3 Stock. 3 9.
We contend that even If courts 53till have the power to
appoint receivers over mort,'m-e l)rerrlf;es, a court of
equity oui;ht not, to exer-sl;e it solely on the ;rounds
under diocut.oion. Vyiy should an insolvent cvver be
force. to make good any unforeseen depreciation In the
value of the property, an,1 be compelled to less the
rents? Does not his ereditor get all he hac to gFive-
the land itself, or its value? The only answer is,
the debtor will be held In judiment for E deficiency,
therefore it can make no difference to him, If theft
deficlency Is lessened before hand by s sequestration of
the rents. In reDlY to that, we would say that ,
receiver i; not asked for or aTpolnted, if the person
liable for the deficiency is solvent. iherefore, In
a foreclosure case , you do what you are not allowed
to do in any other cace, you get a lien on a debtor's
nroTperty, in adwjnce cf a judgment because he is !nsol-
vent. You cannot get an attsnchment in an ordinary
action on any such ground. You cannot K;et a receiver
in any other action on any iuch* rounds. You cnnot
require an executor or tru-tee to give bond on any su~c;
-;round. 'et #ou maintain that a court of equity can
do for you, -ho would take the last ccnt from your In-
solvent debtor, what if not Ionc even in courts of law,
which are aliavs supposed to follow the letter of the
bond to the farthest extent. V'ie maintain that this
is wrong, that it always wa- wrong as between ni:,,L and
man that receivers should be a Tipointed on such ground
alone, wrong in liw, and above all wrong in equity.
But whether it was or not prior to 1880, since then it
Is positively illegal.
The cases in which receivers have been appointed
preoent a curious conglomeration, when an attemptto co-
ordinate them Is made. It would seem that if nome are
sound, others cannot be. They cannot be harmonized
on any ,'eneral thteory. But the crovning case is an
unreported one, where a mortgagor, residing on the mort-
gaged premilee was compelled to attorn to a receiver and
to pay rent. ThiF: if, i logical <:eclolcn. Now ,rtnt-
ed that a mortgaior's.right to rent frora.hIn tenant can
Oc taken iw~av by a reecvet In foreclosure, it loically
follows that if he occupiec the preml,,;e himself',
thereby prTctlct.illy recelving rent, he can be male to
attorn to a recelvee 9.9 any other ten',nt. Put rem-
bering that downi to the time of n" le, he ha, the leg 1 l
title to those prmlieo. ve.;ted in himpelf, in it not
"reductio ad absurdum" to hold th-i.t hAe fiust pay rent
for the unqe of his own land, and pay the w-me to one
who has no right at law or equity to oust him from
possession? Is not this taking of the rents a prac-
tical oustin!7? Is there n, t somethin,- radically
wro-n; in a theor:! whif.h produces ,3ucIP a result?
And now to sum up. The point we have trle; to
make Is thi : t the Revi,)e'! Statutes In takjng -_tway t--_e
rlght of a norti)agee to maintain ejeotment, took away, as
the doctrine is now firmly nettled, hi l'al t! tle to
the mort> premises; coverted thie equitable title
of tile inOut ;u.'or i1-ito ti 1 ' .;u I r)-i, oT rth er , is It
-ave no equitable title. to the mort!-Pi.vee, It 'uperadded
to the equitable title of the Mort {,Lor the l t.7al tle
s wiell. It therefore took away tie fount,1t-lot on
wi'ch alone exlstel the jurlsdlctio of Chncery to
appoint a receiver on the g!rourids uader discussion; the
foundation dsoapluearing, the jurisdiction could not
thereafter be maiatained. During the existence of the
coide of 1846, in the way shown at the outset, the point
could not be well taken. But that way havln: ceainsed
to exist by express repeal, and no similar provision tak-
In;,it It pl'ice, the question since 1871, has been an
open one.
It is to be -leclded on Drinciple. Principle s3ays9:
"equity must follov.- the law", rert must follow the land,
courts, construe, '1o not make contracts. If a specific
plei7e of' the rents in, not mentioned in the bond, the
law does not give it, the court cunnot award It. If
this be sound, the usual sequestration of rents nnd
-----------------------------------------------------
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profits I a foreelocure uilt, by meirin of a recelver,
ip)polnited onlY Oil the :roLuid of Inadequ,.cy and ineol-
veney, It a. "taking of property without clue proce-ie of
law, "
